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Abstract
Th is article considers the common and shared world in teaching, by reference to the concept of profanation 
in relation to biopolitics. “To profane”, means to treat something (or someone) as worldly and as something 
“that can be played with”. Th e act of profanation has implications for how objects that are “put on the table” 
can be regarded in teaching and how these “objects” can become public goods. But what happens when things 
that are used in teaching are representations of social injustice and suff ering? Th is article will give a critique of 
the idea of profanation, specifi cally discussing when teaching deals with social injustice and representations 
of suff ering.
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Introduction
When I think about what feminist politics in education involves, I think of how diff erent 
bodies inhabit a place in education and in teaching; concerns that involve diff erent aspects, 
such as the body, social class, gender, sexuality, ability, emotions and aff ects. But feminist 
politics also involves diff erent kinds of educational institutions, such as kindergartens, pri-
mary schools, high schools and universities, as well as diff erent political systems wherein 
these institutions work. Teaching that takes place in these institutions concerns diff erent 
actions, such as the students and the teachers attending to the objects and to what is “put 
on the table” in front of them.1 Teaching involves inter-generational acts, between an older 
generation and the young, and can be related to the creation of a shared world, to the 
common and the public.2 Or rather, it involves actions that could have the aim of creating, 
or appealing to, the common.
1 Jan Masschelein & Maarten Simons, In Defence of the School: A Public Issue (Leuven: E-ducation, Culture & Soci-
ety Publisher, 2013); Johannes Rytzler, “Teaching as Attention Formation: A Relational Approach to Teaching and 
Attention,” 2017, http://mdh.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:1066806.
2 See for example: Klaus Mollenhauer, Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing, trans. Norm Friesen 
(London: Routledge, 2014), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315883007.
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In recent research within educational philosophy, the public/private aspects of teaching 
have been discussed. For example, Masschelein and Simons have argued in defence of the 
public school,3 and Bergdahl and Langmann have discussed how teaching can be regarded 
as a public as well as a private space.4 In this article I will further discuss the common and 
shared world in teaching and in education by examining how diff erent bodies as well as 
objects inhabit educational situations diff erently. I will do so both normatively and criti-
cally, and more specifi cally, by discussing the concept of profanation in relation to biopoli-
tics, drawing on Giorgio Agamben. Th e act of profanation, which has also been discussed 
within philosophy of education, has implications for the understanding of the common 
as well as for how objects that are “put on the table” can be regarded in teaching.5 Th ese 
implications have educational possibilities, but – and this is the question that I will come 
back to throughout the article – how can the act of profanation in teaching be understood 
in relation to education as a part of the political, of biopolitics, and to social injustice and to 
representations of suff ering? To answer this, I will make feminist readings of these concepts 
of profanation in relation to biopolitics and teaching, drawing on works by Giorgio Agam-
ben, Sara Ahmed, Ken Chen and Alexander G. Weheliye, who have done some important 
work towards understanding power relations, biopolitics and social injustice. 
In the article I will fi rst introduce the term “profanation” and discuss it in relation to 
education and biopolitics and then come to some core questions where I no longer think 
the act of profanation is possible – or rather, I question it in relation to ideas of what it 
means to inhabit a place in the common and in relation to social justice. At the end of the 
article I will develop my critique by taking two diff erent paths, fi rst, referring to Weheliye’s 
critique of biopolitics, and second, referring to Chen and Ahmed’s understanding of poetry 
and representations of violence and suff ering, as well as diff erent ways to encounter these 
kinds of representations of suff ering.6 Th e article discusses the act of representing some-
thing (an object, a historical event, an educational matter or a text/picture in teaching) and, 
as well as, it refl ects on how bodies with fl esh, bones and emotions – that is, students and 
teachers – take their place in educational institutions.
3 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School.
4 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Th ought (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); 
Lovisa Bergdahl & Elisabet Langmann, “‘Where Are You?’ Giving Voice to the Teacher by Reclaiming the Private/
Public Distinction,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 51, no. 2 (May 1, 2017): 461-75, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9752.12244.\\uc0\\u8221{} {\\i{}Journal of Philosophy of Education} 51, no. 2 (May 1, 2017
5 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School.
6 Sara Ahmed, Th e Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004) https://doi.org/10.4324/ 
9780203700372; Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist 
Th eories of the Human (Durham; Duke University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822376491; Ken Chen, 
“Authenticity Obsession, or Conceptualism as Minstrel Show,” Asian American Writers’ Workshop, 2015, http://
aaww.org/authenticity-obsession/.
71Hållander: Inhabiting a Place in the Common
To profane
Th e term profanation comes from religious language, in which one can be said to profane 
that which is sacred. Profanation means to treat something (or someone) as worldly and 
as something “that can be played with”. It is an act that separates the thing from its con-
text and makes it free.7 For Agamben, this concept has religious implications but it also 
has implications for how to understand politics, capitalism and consumption, and it has 
something to say in relation to education.8 Agamben writes: “Sacred and religious were the 
things that in some way belonged to the gods. As such, they were removed from the free 
use and the commerce of men…”.9 Th rough the act of profanation, that which is sacred 
becomes useable. For example, in the act of sacrifi ce there will be a part of the fl esh that 
becomes free – free to use and free to eat. Th ere is a line between using and profaning, 
Agamben writes. For example, one can regard a profane time or a profane thing as decoup-
led from its otherwise normal use.10 It is made available to those who would otherwise not 
usually have access to the thing.
As an example, Agamben relates the term “profanation” to play and how a child who 
plays with ancient or old things does not care about their former use or that they are 
sacred, but fi nds a new use for the things:
“Children, who play with whatever old thing falls into their hands, make toys out of things 
that also belong to the spheres of economics, war, law, and other activities that we are used 
to thinking of as serious. All of a sudden, a car, a fi rearm, or a legal contract becomes a toy.”11
Another example by Agamben is the cat that plays with yarn, and how the yarn, for the 
cat, has another meaning than its original one. To profane things is to treat them as a total 
means. Th ey become useable outside of their original sphere. Th e same goes for museums 
(which can be rooms, buildings, or whole cities), which are, as Agamben writes, “separate 
dimensions to which what was once – but is no longer”.12 Th e things in a museum are not 
there to be used anymore, but to be observed or looked at. Th ey have been separated from 
their ordinary area and use.
Profanation has a function in religious life, but as Agamben shows, it also has meaning 
in relation to such diverse topics as play, museums, and – Agamben’s area of interest – to 
(bio)politics. Th e connection is made by how profanation should be understood in relation 
to the common, to the public:
7 Giorgio Agamben, Profanations (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
8 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School.
9 Agamben, Profanations, 75.
10 Agamben, Profanations, 74.
11 Agamben, Profanations, 76.
12 Agamben, Profanations, 74.
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“Profanation, however, neutralizes what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was una-
vailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use. Both are political operations: the 
fi rst guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred model; the second 
deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces that power 
had seized.”13
Agamben reminds us how it was through the act of profanation that the “free man” in 
ancient Greek and Roman worlds got access to that which was considered to be sacred. It 
was made free and available to be played with. Here, profanation and the common inter-
sect, and this is where education also has a role, since it is the very place where these acti-
ons of profanation can take place, something that I will discuss further below. 
Education as free time
In Masschelein and Simons’ In Defence of the School, they begin in antiquity and from there 
they try to pinpoint what the public school can be as an ideal.14 Th ey write that the idea of 
the school is based on the idea of free time, which is the most common translation of the 
word Schole, namely, free time to study and to practise: 
“In other words, the school provided free time, that is, non-productive time, to those who 
by their birth and their place in society (their ‘position’) had no right to claim it. Or, put dif-
ferently still, what the school did was to establish a time and space that was in a sense detac-
hed from the time and space of both society (Greek: polis) and the household (Greek: oikos). 
It was also an egalitarian time and therefore the invention of the school can be described as 
the democratization of free time.”15 
Th e idea of free time was that the school could be a place that off ered knowledge and expe-
rience to the public.16 Th e students who attended the school were able to leave behind the 
roles, identities and work associated with their life outside the school; in other words, they 
could be suspended from their other life. Masschelein and Simons write:
“Th e school is the time and space where students can let go of all kinds of sociological, eco-
nomic, familial and culture-related rules and expectations. In other words, giving form to the 
school – making school – has to do with a kind of suspension of the weight of these rules. A 
13 Agamben, Profanations, 77.
14 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School.
15 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 28.
16 I would like to thank the reviewers of this article who reminded me that a form of public and compulsory 
education may have been introduced in some cities in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, which could have 
challenged the existing power structure during that time. Doubtless, education also had from its very beginning 
a reproductive function, but at the same time it was complex and surely had its own explicitly or subtly violent 
modes of exclusion, discrimination and power politics.
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suspension, for instance, of the rules that dictate or explain why someone – and his or her 
whole family or group – falls on a certain rung of the social ladder.”17
As part of the suspension from the second – other – life, people inhabited the school as 
students. It is a category that has certain connotations – as a subject created and open to 
transformation. But also, as argued by Masschelein and Simon as well as by Tyson Lewis, 
the student is in school to study.18 Th e suspension means that the roles that exist in other 
areas, such as in the home, are no longer valid – students do not attend school as daugh-
ters or sons, or as carriers of class, gender or specifi c origins (which of course can be que-
stioned and something that I will come back to). Th is suspension is limited in time (during 
school time) and is something students come in and out of during the day and during the 
school year. 
It is in relation to this free separated time that the act of profanation also has a function. 
It is in this separated time that students, through the act of profanation, make objects 
and things available and public. In relation to educational theory, Masschelein and Simons 
write that the idea of profanation stands in relation to what it means to make something 
available, to make it a public or common good, in teaching. Th ey discuss it in relation to 
play (which goes back to the understanding of the Latin word for school, ludus, which also 
means “game” or “play”), and to what is put on the table in front of the students. Th ey write:
“…something (a text, an action) is being off ered up and simultaneously becomes separated 
from its function and signifi cance in social order; something that appears in and of itself, as 
an object of study or practice, regardless of its appropriate use (in the home, or in society, 
outside the school). When something becomes an object of study or practice, it means that 
it demands our attention; it invites us to explore it and engage it, regardless of how it can be 
put to use.”19
Th e idea of profanation and the understanding of use stand in relation to Masschelein and 
Simons’ idea of the public school, and also to the idea of teaching. Th at is, how “to put 
something on the table”, in front of our gaze, our hearing and our hands, can be regarded as 
something central for teaching. Masschelein and Simons, also drawing on Agamben, regard 
this action of profanation as a way to create free time (for study). 
Free time, for whom?
Th e act of profanation, as well as the separation, contributes to the possibility of free time. 
Masschelein and Simon’s book wants to defend the public school, as the title clearly states: 
17 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 35.
18 See also: Tyson E. Lewis, On Study: Giorgio Agamben and Educational Potentiality (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203069622.
19 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 40.
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In Defence of the School: A Public Issue. It is a defence of a public school that in past years 
has undergone some serious changes and demands related to marketization, alienation 
and corruption as well as criticism for reproducing the class system or for failing to produce 
graduates that are employable and eff ective in other areas of life.20 Th e idea of education as 
a separate time, a free time which separates students from their other life (outside school), 
can be related to Agamben’s idea and argument concerning how profanation works in 
relation to the common. Th rough actions of profanation, the things at hand become avai-
lable, free to use, and they become public goods. What we can see from Masschelein and 
Simons’ argument is that the ideas of profanation and suspension have a bearing on a 
theory on what education can be, as an ideal, of what to think and strive for. Th ere is 
something important in this, especially when relating it to the otherwise productive life, 
for example, jobs that I have had, working-class jobs, like working in kitchens or factories, 
or as a care assistant for the elderly, where free time is non-existent. Rather the opposite, as 
the Swedish poet Emil Boss’ poems speak of in Acceleration, or the writers in the book Lösa 
förbindelser, on the working conditions for the commercial employees, how every hour 
can be counted and clocked, every movement (with both left hand and right hand) can 
be maximized.21 But even if this is an important aspect to highlight, entering education is 
not done beyond our bodies (with our social class, gender, sexuality, abilities, emotions and 
aff ects) but rather through them. Masschelein and Simons also refer to this reproduction 
of social injustice, but they argue that: 
“the ever-present attempts at co-option and corruption occur precisely to tame the distinct 
and radical potential that is unique to the scholastic itself. From its inception in the Greek 
city states, school time has been time in which ‘capital’ (knowledge, skills, culture) is expro-
priated, released as a common good for public use, thus existing independent of talent, abi-
lity and income.”22
In relation to this idea of entering school beyond social class, and existing independent of 
talent, ability and income, I think of two diff erent things. 
First, I think of my own experience in an educational situation, during my three years 
of studying to become a chef in Borås, Sweden, during the 1990s. Inhabiting a place in that 
school and in that classroom is slightly diff erent from other institutionalized situations, 
since it involves a restaurant and, more specifi cally for me, since I chose the restaurant and 
not the servant path, the restaurant kitchen, which was at the school and also involved 
working in diff erent restaurant kitchen, as internships. It involved the very practice of pro-
fanation, as we handled food: meat, vegetables, and fi sh and so on. It was food that in 
20 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 15-16.
21 Emil Boss, Acceleration: Dikt (Stockholm: Bokförlaget Lejd, 2017); Jenny Wrangborg, Lösa förbindelser: om 
kampen för fasta förhållanden i handeln (Stockholm: Leopard, 2017).
22 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 16.
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some contexts could be considered sacred but in the kitchen was not. In the educational 
kitchen, we could experiment with the food but also learn traditional dishes. Inhabiting a 
place in that situation was for me a very gendered and class-based experience (of becoming 
a female chef in a male dominated occupation), but it could also be sexualized and racial-
ized and involve diff erent aspects, such as ability or diff erent skills (being quick or slow, the 
handcraft of slicing, preparing, cleaning and so forth). Th e idea of the possibility of inhabit-
ing an educational institution and teaching beyond the sociological categories overlook 
the fact that educational institutions are the very central part and base where class and 
gender are created and reproduced. Th e educational practice was free in the sense that we 
focused on what was put in front of us, but at the same time we were shaped into social 
beings and workers.
Second, and in line with what I have explored elsewhere, testimonies that witness his-
torical injustice – diff erent parts of and stories from history that speak of sexism, slav-
ery, colonial and social injustice, class and racist violence – can be regarded as something 
impossible.23 Th ey are stories that speak of that which is diffi  cult, and they present ethical, 
political, and epistemological challenges. One therefore has to ask, can everything that is 
put on the table be used and profaned and be regarded as pure means? Can testimonies 
be explored and involved in whatever way they can be used? If not, which other ways are 
possible? 
In a discussion on the public matter of the school, Bergdahl and Langmann go back to 
Arendt’s understanding of how the public (polis) is separated both from the private realm 
of the home and from the impersonal sphere of the social. Rather, it is a “sphere that people 
come together in a particular way to deliberate on things held in common”.24 Bergdahl and 
Langmann argue, drawing on feminist philosophers such as Irigaray, that the school is nei-
ther a private nor public sphere but includes aspects of both.25 To extend their critique on 
what to inhabit the common world could mean, I will discuss diff erent aspects in relation 
to profanation. First, I will deepen the understanding of biopolitics in relation to educa-
tion as well as to profanation, and after that I will discuss recent critiques of understand-
ings of biopolitics, drawing on Weheliye’s black feminism. Second, I will draw on Chen and 
Ahmed’s diff erent readings of representations of suff erings, where I discuss what it means 
to represent something in relation to teaching, as well as in relation to emotions. At the 
end of the article I will come back to what the act of profanation and what inhabiting a 
place in the public can include.
23 Hållander, Marie, Det omöjliga vittnande: Om vittnesmålets pedagogiska möjligheter (Malmö: Eskaton, 2017).
24 Bergdahl & Langmann, “‘Where Are You?,” 465.”container-title”:”Journal of Philosophy of Education”,”page”:”461-
475”,”volume”:”51”,”issue”:”2”,”source”:”Wiley Online Library”,”abstract”:”In a time of cultural pluralism and legiti-
mation crisis (Habermas
25 Bergdahl & Langmann, 473.”container-title”:”Journal of Philosophy of Education”,”page”:”461-475”,”volume”:”51”,”is
sue”:”2”,”source”:”Wiley Online Library”,”abstract”:”In a time of cultural pluralism and legitimation crisis (Haber-
mas
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Biopolitics and education 
Th e connection between the state and educational systems diff ers depending on which 
educational system we are talking about. Th e educational idea can be formulated through 
the idea of freedom, but education can also be used by diff erent leaders and states to con-
trol the people; the control has also been apparent with bodily punishments or/and with 
the exclusion of diff erent minorities or the working class from education. In relation to the 
capitalist society, Tyson Lewis writes that the current capitalist society has implications for 
our educational systems, where “[t]he subject is captured as a resource of the world; his 
or her choices become nothing more than refl exes of the needs of the world to replicate 
itself”.26 Th e control over people’s lives takes diff erent forms, and education and pedagogies 
do not fall outside the biopolitical but are instead at the very centre of it. 
To achieve a deeper understanding of profanation and why Agamben writes about it, 
one has to relate it to the understanding of the political, an understanding that also has 
implications for education in relation to how states shape bodies and institutions. Agam-
ben develops his ideas about the political in diff erent books, and a term that is central to 
understanding his philosophy is biopolitics. It is a term that works at the intersection of 
politics and biology, or rather, it is a way to see how politics controls life as well as death. 
Among other books, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life reveals and problematizes 
the fundamental relationship between political sovereignty and naked life (la nuda vita) 
and how this relationship is fundamental to how subjects in the diff erent nations are able 
to appear in the public life or how they are left outside of it.27 
According to Agamben, states become sovereign by controlling both zoe and bios, both 
the “living, naked life” and the “qualifi ed life” in, for example, politics, which means that 
states have the opportunity to become sovereign through diff erential acts and by placing 
subjects within as well as outside the law.28 An extreme form of biopolitics was found in 
Nazi Germany, with its extermination camps, but the governance can also be applied to 
the control of other states (and in Sweden we have numerous examples of this from recent 
history, including forced sterilization of groups and class and racial decisions on schooling 
(or rather non-schooling) of some children by classifying non-normative sexualities as 
diseases etc. States control, but as I also would like to include other actors of power such as 
owners of capital, the living and bare life (zoe) through diff erent decisions. Th is means sub-
jects have diff erent opportunities to enter the qualifying life, and thus appear as subjects, 
26 Lewis, On Study, 7.
27 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 1st ed. (Stanford University Press, 1998).
28 Homo Sacer is a fi gure in Roman law, where the holy and sacred character of the law is bound to human life. It says: 
“Th e sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifi ce this 
man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the fi rst tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that 
”if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.” Agamben, 
Homo Sacer, 71. It is a double bind where the person can be killed and have in that sense no legal rights. Th e person 
being counted as homo sacer is at the same time inside the law as well as outside the law.
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since this discussion about biopolitics is ultimately about subjectivity. Agamben writes in 
What is an apparatus?:
“What defi nes the apparatuses that we have to deal with in the current phase of capitalism is 
that they no longer act as much through the production of a subject as through the proces-
ses of what can be called desubjectifi cation.” 29
Agamben connects desubjectivity with several diff erent historical and contemporary sub-
jects, such as the historical fi gure of homo sacer in Roman law, or with the Muselmänner in 
Auschwitz.30 But one can also make connections to refugees who do not have access and 
legal rights in the context in which they are located because they are outside states and 
laws. In a further reading, desubjectivity can also be made in relation to those who lack 
voice or who are unable to infl uence their lives, whose choice only means, in the Swedish 
poet Stig Sjödin’s words: ”den stora favören att få välja / där val ej fanns” (“the great favor of 
choosing / where there was no choice”).31 Agamben’s investigation of these fi gures (homo 
sacer, naked life, qualifi ed life, etc.) shows how political sovereignty is also based on ruling 
out and enclosing, as well as controlling people’s lives. It is through these exclusions and 
inclusions that states become sovereign: they are the ones that have the opportunity to 
suspend the law and impose a state of exception.32
Biopolitics and profanation 
At the very end of the essay Profanation, Agamben writes: “Th e profanation of the unpro-
fanable is the political task of the coming generation.”33 Th e concept of profanation can be 
regarded as a political concept, and I regard Agamben’s work on profanation as a refl ec-
tion of this state of capitalism and biopolitics: is it possible to think of actions that create 
spaces and times that do not exclude people?34 Are there actions that make things, and also 
people, a part of the common or that can be related to a common future? 
Agamben writes that the state that the western world today is in of capitalism (as a 
religion, drawing on Walter Benjamin’s fragment “Capitalism as Religion”) has the function 
of trying to fi nd that which is unprofanable. Th is idea is diff erent from – opposite to – the 
idea of the child playing with toys or the cat playing with yarn. Th e logic of capitalism is dif-
ferent, since its aim is to create spaces and places that are not profanable; rather, capitalism 
and consumption aim at creating spaces that are no longer separated: capitalism “realizes 
29 Giorgio Agamben, “What Is an Apparatus?” And Other Essays (Stanford University Press, 2009), 70.
30 Agamben, Homo Sacer.
31 Stig Sjödin & Erling Öhrnell, Sotfragment : Dikter (Göteborg: Lindelöw, 1996), 34.
32 Giorgio Agamben, Undantagstillståndet, trans. Sven-Olov Wallenstein, Site Edition (Lund: Propexus, 2005).
33 Agamben, Profanations, 92.
34 Agamben, Profanations, 83.
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a pure form of separation, to the point that there is nothing left to separate”.35 Th ere are 
no longer sacred days and weekdays: every day is open to work, exploitation and maxi-
mization of profi t. Agamben continues: “If to profane means to return to common use 
that which has removed to the sphere of the sacred, the capitalist religion in its extreme 
phase aims creating something absolutely unprofanable.”36 Consumption is something that 
does not belong to the present, he writes, but to the past or the future. It belongs to our 
memory or to our anticipation. Th e call for profanation can, through this lens, be regarded 
as a way to open up the capitalist system, to see how it works and what its problems are. 
Black feminism and biopolitics
Weheliye’s book Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Th e-
ories of the Human gives a critique of how researchers and philosophers such as Agamben 
and Foucault do not include race as a fundamental part of biopolitics. Weheliye argues that 
there is a need for a reconceptualization of race, subjectivity and humanity to Agamben’s 
and Foucault’s considerations of racism vis-à-vis biopolitics since they have been too vague, 
or rather, that the concepts of Foucault and Agamben have been “deemed transposable 
to a variety of spatiotemporal contexts because the authors do not speak from an expli-
citly racialized system ... which lends their ideas more credibility and, once again, displaces 
minority discourse”.37 He argues that race should in fact be placed at the very centre of the 
understanding of the argument of biopolitics. In this vein, Weheliye argues
“that black studies and other formations of critical ethnic studies provide crucial viewpoints, 
often overlooked or actively neglected in bare life and biopolitics discourse, in the produ-
ction of racialization as an object of knowledge, especially in its interfacing with political 
violence and (de)humanization.”38
Furthermore, he stresses that race should be placed at the front and centre in considera-
tions of political violence.39 Bracketing the diff erent bodies that are present in education 
does not make the bodies into one uniform being, in the coming community, rather, it 
neglects them. It puts them, once again, into the minority discourse – in the margins and 
in the footnotes.
What I want to say with Weheliye’s critique of how biopolitics is understood and used 
is that the argument also has bearings on the understanding of the idea about what the 
public school could mean. Displacing the gendered experience or the racialized and so 
35 Agamben, Profanations, 81.
36 Agamben, Profanations, 82.
37 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus, 13.
38 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus 13.
39 Weheliye, Habeas Viscus 13.
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forth, understanding of the public school as a place where students can leave their social 
backgrounds, once again puts the gendered, diff erent class-based and racialized experience 
in the margins and footnotes.
Regarding the act of profanation through the diff erent aspects that I have discussed 
here, that is, in relation to biopolitics and desubjectivity, in relation to the capitalist system 
and in relation to how understandings of the biopolitical have marginalized race as a fun-
damental part of how it functions in diff erent states, I will here try to rethink and develop 
what inhabiting a place in the common can mean. I will do so by shifting from profanation 
towards Ahmed’s and Chen’s critique on representations of social injustice.  
Regardless, of what?
Ken Chen, in his article “Authenticity Obsession, or Conceptualism as Minstrel Show”, 
discusses various poetic performances that deal with colonial and racist violence and how 
they balance between a poetic testimony, on the one hand, and an exposure on the other.40 
For example, Chen discusses conceptual poetry in the US and, more specifi cally, Kenneth 
Goldsmith’s poetry. Goldsmith is a poet who created a reading of Michael Brown’s autopsy 
protocol. Th e shooting of Michael Brown, an 18-year-old black man, occurred on August 
9, 2014, in Ferguson, Missouri, a northern suburb of St. Louis. In relation to this poetic act, 
which used the autopsy protocol of Brown’s body, Chen asks whether there is a line that 
separates a “poetic testimony” from one that expropriates and exploits already vulnerable 
bodies:
“What is the ethically responsible way to show the occult photographs of lynchings […]? 
How can one present such images of sublime horror without either simple-mindedly reena-
cting their violence or disenchanting them into clichés? How can one gaze on the memento 
mori of colonial horror without staring with the gaze of Medusa? What is the line separating 
one writer as a poet of witness and another as a poet of expropriation […]?”41 
In terms similar to Chen’s, I ask where the line is between a teaching built on witnessing, on 
the one hand, and an education that expropriates the bodies of others, on the other hand. 
As I see it, it is in relation to these questions that Masschelein and Simons’ development 
of Agamben’s notion of profanation must be problematized. Can testimonies, the material 
that is placed on the table, be profaned, and can we “explore it and engage it, regardless of 
how it can be put to use”?42 Where is the line between use and abuse? Th e questions are 
rhetorical and not possible to answer. In relation to this, however, Ahmed’s understanding 
of emotions, related to historical stories of suff ering, are fruitful to read.
40 Chen, “Authenticity Obsession, or Conceptualism as Minstrel Show.”
41 Chen, 2015.
42 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 35.
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Th rough a Marxist analysis of the wound and suff ering, Ahmed writes about how the 
wounds and testimonies are parts of the global market. Sensational stories and testimo-
nies can turn pain into a form of media spectacle, which, as well as giving rise to sorrow 
or anger and the like, can likewise be met with laughter. Testimonies about suff ering and 
wounds (and Ahmed is specifi cally speaking of testimonies that are marketed through vari-
ous aid organizations) tend to become global and thus are a part of a global economy: the 
testimonies can be honoured and fetishized. Commodity fetishism transforms the subjec-
tive, abstract aspects of economic value into objective, real things that people believe have 
intrinsic value. According to Ahmed, this fetishism is also a central part of the testimony 
culture, where aid organizations can use personal stories to raise money. Ahmed writes 
that “the diff erentiation between forms of pain and suff ering in stories that are told, and 
between those that are told and those that are not told, is a crucial mechanism for the 
distribution of power”.43 Th ese boundaries also mean that the stories of suff ering are rela-
tional: the witnesses stand in relation to diff erent nations, movements and subjects. As an 
example, Ahmed mentions an aid organization’s stories of war, where the stories were not 
aimed at those actually suff ering from the blasts of mines but rather at those reached by 
the testimony – at those asked to give money. Th e “value” of the testimony and human 
response to it is created through a circulation in the global economy. Based on this analysis 
of the emotions that people are asked to feel in response to the testimony, Ahmed believes 
that emotions are not something we have, but rather that they are something that creates 
an inside and an outside, establish boundaries between them.44 Ahmed’s reading of dif-
ferent historical wounds, in relation to emotions, highlights how the past, as well as the 
present, is not one homogeneous entity. It is full of diff erent bodies and histories, wounds, 
and diff erent power relations and it stands in relation to diff erent nations, movements and 
subjects.
Ahmed does not here speak in terms of profaning stories, nor does she speak of the line 
between use and abuse, but rather about how to read historical wounds, through oneself. 
Ahmed writes in relation to Fiona’s testimony; on how Fiona, an Aboriginal in Australia, 
was taken from her mother:
“It is not just me facing this, and it is certainly not about me. And yet, I am ‘in it’, which means 
I am not ‘not in it’. Here I am, already placed and located in worlds, already shaped by my 
43 Ahmed, Th e Cultural Politics of Emotion, 32.
44 In Th e Cultural Politics of Emotions, Ahmed experiences diff erent feelings such as love, hate, pain, shame and 
shows how they create boundaries. She is not interested in what they are, but rather what they do, politically and 
technically. And she argues for how they are sticky, and how they connect, and disconnect, for example through 
“the love of the nation”, “the hate of the others”. Emotions can have a function of determining the relational form 
that takes place, it is possible to say, through Ahmed, that this also applies to other emotions, such as hatred and 
love. Th e feelings are aimed at someone, or against something – and thus determine how and in what way the 
relationship will take place.
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proximity to some bodies and not to others. If I am here, then I am there: the stories of the 
document are shaped by the land I had been thought to think of as my own.”45 
 Th rough Ahmed, and this is my point of view, I learn how there are other ways to encounter 
stories of suff ering than through the idea that they can be used or misused. Rather, the 
reading or the encounter of injustice can include knowledge of how I am in it, a part of it, 
of history, and at the same time, not ‘not’ in it. Th e reading, Ahmed writes, is not about 
her feelings, or about her, or how she can use it. Rather, the knowledge of this history is a 
form of involvement which is not easy or obvious knowledge, rather the opposite, since it 
also includes knowledge about oneself and one’s own history. Th ese encounters, readings 
of representations of suff ering, can also be a part of what it means to inhabit the public. 
Regarding the act of profanation through this lens, dealing with questions of social inju-
stice, racism and representations of suff ering, as with Brown’s autopsy protocol, and as with 
Fiona’s testimony and Ahmed’s reading, puts the understanding of use in another light. It 
puts it in a more ethical as well as political light.46
Conclusion 
At the very beginning of Th e Coming Community, Agamben writes: “Th e coming being is 
whatever being.”47 Th e whatever being is related to a singularity, such as it is. It is a being 
that is not related to a concept: “being red, being French, being Muslim, but only in its being 
such as it is”.48 Th erefore, the ideal of inhabiting the common is, for Agamben, a state where 
we have the possibility of entering the common beyond our social categories.
Agamben’s understanding of profanation is diff erent from what Ahmed talks about 
with fetishism. Agamben is speaking of diff erent aspects and things, such as a toy, or a 
museum, and Ahmed is speaking of historical wounds, such as the loss of a child because 
of racism in Australia. On the other hand, both of them are giving a Marxian critique of 
the capitalist system of creating injustice, but where Agamben, as well as Masschelein and 
Simons, tries to think of a future and a school beyond social class and gender, Ahmed, as 
well as Chen and Weheliye, instead puts these social categories at the centre – since the 
opposite, again, puts these experience in the footnotes and in the margins. And even if 
Masschelein and Simons do not deny that schools are a part of reproducing an elite as well 
as a working class, they put the ideal of the scholastic school at the centre. As I have shown 
in this article, this argument has some problems, especially regarding social injustice and 
cases of historical wounds.
45 Ahmed, Th e Cultural Politics of Emotions, 36.
46 See also: Hållander, Det omöjliga vittnandet.
47 Giorgio Agamben, Th e Coming Community, Th eory Out of Bounds, 99-1970768-6 ; [1] (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993).
48 Agamben, Th e Coming Community, 1.
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Educational institutions are a part of shaping students into social beings. Th rough the 
understanding of education in connection to biopolitics, I argue that bodies (with their 
diff erent aspects of social class, gender, sexuality, ability, emotions and aff ects) do not exist 
beyond their own bodies, but through them and, perhaps, because of their own bodies. 
Th ey do not “let go of all kinds of sociological, economic, familial and culture-related rules 
and expectations”,49 but rather live them, from within. 
Education as free time, suspended from the other time that is productive, is, however 
something that is important to highlight, not only because it tries to defend the public, 
common school, but also because it can highlight the other language that does not speak 
of free time, but rather about competition, maximization and production. And, even if I am 
sympathetic towards Masschelein and Simons’ defence of the public school, I disagree with 
that there exist a possibility of inhabiting schools beyond our social ladder and social being. 
An education that is free from productivity and eff ectiveness is something diff erent from 
being free from social and cultural aspects. Let’s not put these aspects in the footnotes any 
longer.
49 Masschelein & Simons, In Defence of the School, 35.
